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Robinson-Patman Act
To maximize profits and maintain a steady volume of metropolitan
area sales in the face of price competition, major oil companies charge
their dealers different prices for the gasoline they sell. With certain
exceptions, § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act1 forbids price discrimi-
nation where its effect may be substantially to lessen competition or
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who grants
or receives the benefit of such discrimination.
If found to have violated § 2(a), a major supplier will seek to avail
himself of the Act's § 2(b) "meeting competition defense."" Des.pite
the Supreme Court's two major opinions on the nature of the § 2(b)
defense in the context of gasoline marketing,3 the content of this pro-
vision is still in dispute. In Bargain Car Wash v. Standard Oil Company
(Indiana),4 the Seventh Circuit recently remanded to the district court
for a determination of the circumstances under which the § 2(b) meet-
ing competition defense is available to a major gasoline supplier.
This Note argues that there is no competition to meet at the whole-
sale level because of the de facto exclusive dealing arrangements under
which major oil companies market gasoline and hence that the meeting
competition defense should be unavailable. Such an interpretation, far
from protecting competitors at the expense of competition as the Act
has frequently been accused of doing3 would tend to foster more wide-
spread price competition in the retailing of gasoline.
1. The Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970) [hereinafter
cited as the Act], provides in pertinent part:
§ 2(a) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between dif-
ferent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of
the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, .... where the cfect
of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them . ..
2. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970):
§ 2(b) Upon proof being made ... that there has been discrimination in price . . .
the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification
shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section . . . . Provided,
however, that nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting a prima-facie
case thus made by showing that his lower price . . . was made in good faith to meet
an equally low price of a competitor ....
3. F.T.C. v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963); Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231
(1951).
4. 466 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1972).
5. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
502 (1971); Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 704-06 (1967) (Stewart,
J., dissenting); Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951).
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I
In Bargain Car Wash, American Oil Company, the marketing sub-
sidiary of Standard Oil Company of Indiana, like other major oil
corporations, 6 was able to price discriminate 7 among competing Ameri-
can dealers because three conditions necessary for profit-maximizing
price discrimination existed: The supplier had market power in that
its dealers bought gasoline only from it; the supplier had divided the
metropolitan area into zones and was able to charge different prices
from zone to zone; and the supplier was able to prevent arbitrage, i.e.,
the resale of gas by low-price zone dealers to high-price zone dealers."
Market Power. A major oil company supplies gasoline to its dealers
and leases the station and equipment from which the gas is sold." Al-
though the lease does not explicitly require the dealer to purchase his
gasoline exclusively from his lessor-supplier, 10 a number of features of
the supply contract, which is executed simultaneously with the lease,
make it impractical for a dealer to purchase gasoline from suppliers
6. Classification of firms engaged in one or more levels of the oil industry into
"majors" and "independents" is inevitably arbitrary. For purposes of this discussion.
"major" refers to those companies which are integrated from crude production to refining
and which lease most of their stations to self-employed dealers.
7. Such price discrimination at the wholesale level is intended to effect a change in
retail prices. Majors generally use a 70/30 shared margin reduction formula. For exam-
ple, the supplier will reduce his wholesale price 1.40 and suggest that the dealer lower
the retail price by 20. See F. ALLVINE & J. PATERSON., Co.lP1rrzo. LTD.: TIE MAnEr NC
OF GASOLINE 181 (1972); Hearings on Marketing Practices in the Gasoline Industry Belore
the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Const. on the Judiciar,, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 452 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Marketing Practices
in the Gasoline Industry]. A supplier is able to lower prices for a specific time period
and an exact number of gallons by either retaining title to the gasoline while it is in
the dealer's storage tanks or by a system of rebates granted to the dealer. See 2 Hearings
of the FTC Industry Conference on Marketing of Automotive Gasoline Before Subcouun.
No. 4 on Distribution Problems of House Select Cotna. on Small Business, 89th Cong..
Ist Sess., 1148-50, 1722, 1757 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings of the FTC Industry
Conference on Marketing of Automotive Gasoline]. These arrangements arguably run
afoul of the Sherman Act's prohibition of maximum or minimum resale price main-
tenance, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968). While the
conditioning of price allowances on minimum resale price is illegal, it is still unclear
whether a supplier may condition dealer allowances on the posting of lower retail prices.
Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972).
8. F. ScHFRER, supra note 5, at 253; Telser, Abusive Trade Practice: An Economic
Analysis, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 488, 496 (1965).
9. The terms of the supply contract are frequently incorporated by reference into the
lease; violation of any of the terms of the contract ives the lesor the option to cancel or
terminate the lease. See generally Hearings on Marketing Practices in the Gasoline Indus-
try, supra note 7. The leases usually run for a year. though some are executed for a term
of three to five years. See, e.g., Hearings on Problems of Small Business in Gasoline
Marketing Before the Subcomm. on Activities of Regulatory Agencies Relating to Small
Business of the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong.. 2d Sess. 87-90 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Problems of Small Business ins Gasoline Marheting].
This subjects the relationship with the lessor-supplier to frequent review.
10. It does not for the simple reason that such an exclusive dealing arrangement is
illegal under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). Standard Oil Co. of Cal. and
Standard Stations v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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other than American. In the supply contract the dealer agrees to accept
deliveries of American gasoline." The dealer also agrees not to mix
American brand gasoline with other brands. American thus need only
keep minimum quantities of its gasoline in the dealer's storage tanks
to foreclose the dealer from alternative sources of supply. Moreover,
if the dealer did sell another brand of gasoline, he would have to oblit-
erate all American trademarks and insignia from the station and face
the prospect of not having the lease renewed.
12
Zone Pricing. Like other major oil companies, American divides a
metropolitan marketing area into numerous zones through which it
administers its price discrimination, changing wholesale prices from
zone to zone' 3 in response to the level of competitive stations' retail
prices and in light of its overall volume goal for the metropolitan
area. 14 The court in Bargain Car Wash found, and American officials
acknowledged, that these zones do not represent actual competitive
markets for the sale of gasoline.' 5 In fact, they were drawn so narrowly
that in spite of consumer mobility American had created twenty-two
zones within a one and one-half mile radius of the plaintiff-dealer's
station.'
Prevention of Arbitrage. Because American does not obligate itself
to supply a dealer with all the gasoline he demands, it can prevent a
11. If the lease required the lessee-dealer to purchase gasoline from the lessor.supplier,
an illegal tie-in could result. Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970) and
§§ 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1970), prohibit the sale or lease of one
item on the condition that a second "tied" product is purchased where the effect of tile
tied sale is to foreclose competitors from any "substantial" market. See Fortner Enter-
prises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. V.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1917).
But see F.T.C. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
12. The economics of station rental also make it clear that a dealer will not be per-
mitted to sell another supplier's gasoline. Major oil companies charge their dealers it
rental amount that does not yield a fair market return on the value of real estate leased.
See, e.g., Hearings on Marketing Practices in the Gasoline industry, supra note 7, pt. 2,
at 881-82, 903; id. pt. 3, at 111-12. In some cases the supplier is paying a third party more
rent for the property than the supplier is charging the dealer. Hearings on Problems of
Small Business in Gasoline Marketing, supra note 9, at 215; Hearings on Marketing Prac-
tices in the Gasoline Industry, supra note 7, 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 903. The lessor.supplier's
profit on the station, however, is made up of more than the rent earned in the landlord-
tenant relationship. 1 Hearings of the FTC Industry Conference on Marketing of Auto.
motive Gasoline, supra note 7, at 202. The supplier obtains a number of outlets that will
sell gas in the manner he wants it sold. If the dealer does not sell the gallonage the sup-
plier expects from the station, it is in the supplier's economic self.interest to cancel or to
fail to renew the lease and to find a new dealer. Id. at 465.
13. See note 7 supra.
14. High fixed costs of gasoline production and a marginal cost which decreases con-
stantly until full capacity is reached place a premium on full utilization of refining
capacity through maintenance of a constant volume of wholesale gasoline sales. Hearings
on Problems of Small Business in Gasoline Marketing, supra note 9, at 290.91.
15. 466 F.2d at 1168.
16. Id. at 1169.
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low-price zone dealer from reselling gasoline to a nonfavored high-price
zone dealer. In addition, the rental structure of the station lease agree-
ment inhibits such arbitrage. Rent is calculated on a cents-per-gallon-
sold formula.' 7 As a result, the wholesale price differential between
dealers would have to exceed the per gallonage rental payment before
resale would be profitable. American was thus able to charge the plain-
tiff-dealer in Bargain Car Vash more for American gasoline than it
charged other nearby American dealers.
This elaborate and sophisticated zone price discrimination is the
response of major oil companies to price competition in the retail gaso-
line market.'8 While majoi oil companies prefer to compete in terms
of product differentiation, offering free road maps and engaging in
extensive advertising to create brand loyalty, other segments of gasoline
retailing compete more in terms of price."' Price discrimination enables
majors to maintain city-wide volume while selectively lowering prices
in areas where price competition is significant, thus confining price
disturbances to a small area, limiting the number of American dealers
involved, and maintaining a higher profit margin on a company-wide
basis.20
II
Alleging injury caused by American's price discrimination in favor
of competing American dealers, the plaintiff-dealer in Bargain Car
Wash brought a treble-damage action under the Robinson-Patman
Act21 against his supplier. To invoke the substantive portions of the
Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate two or more consummated sales in
commerce2 2 which occur reasonably contemporaneously and involve
17. Oftentimes a supplier will not charge the dealer the per gallon rent after someminimum number of gallons are sold in order to induce a dealer to reduce the retailprice. See Hearings on Marketing Practices in the Gasoline Indusiry, supra note 7. pt. 1.at 166. When such arrangements are not available to all dealers, as was the case inBargain Car Wash, the supplier is violating § 2(a) of the Act by "indirectl)" price dis-criminating. 466 F.2d at 1169. Moreover, there cannot be a meeting competition defense
to this second type of price discrimination. 466 F.2d at 1175 n.7.
18. See 466 F.2d at 1167.
19. See generally Dixon, Oligopoly and Price Wars: A Case Study in Gasoline, I A%-n-TRUST L. & EcoN. Rav. 53 (July-August 1967); Dixon, Comment on Mueller's "Structural"Approach: Dimensions of Oligopolistic Interdependence in Gasoline, 1 Ai-rnusr L. &ECON. Rv. 123 (Summer 1968); FoRnEs, Sept. 1, 1970, at 40; FORTUNE, June 1969, at 109;Note, Competition in Gasoline Retailing: A Price War, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 644 (1953).
20. 466 F.2d at 1168.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
22. Jurisdiction under the Act has traditionally been held to require that at least onetransaction cross a state line. See, e.g., Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp.. 464 F.2d 26, 36-37 (5thCir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972); F. Rowa, PRICE DI CRIMINATION UNDER THER Rony-SON-PATMAN Acr § 4.9 (1962). In the field of gasoline marketing the requisite sales "in
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commodities of like grade and quality, in which a different price is
charged by the same seller to two or more purchasers for use, consump-
tion, or resale within the United States or a territory thereof, and which
may result in competitive injury.
The requisite competitive injury necessary to prove a violation of
§ 2(a) may occur on any one of three commercial levels: (1) injury at the
level of the seller's competitors (primary-line injury), (2) injury at the
buyer's level (secondary-line injury), or (3) injury at the level of the
buyer's customers (tertiary-line injury)..2 3 As consumers are not in con-
petition, there was no tertiary-line injury. While there can be supplier
or primary-line injury in gasoline marketing,24 the focus in Bargain
Car Wash is on secondary-line injury: injury to competition in gaso-
line retailing.
Litigation under the Robinson-Patman Act has established that sub-
stantial price differentials for a significant period of time 2 are prima
facie violative of § 2(a),26 particularly where, as in gasoline marketing,
competition is keen and the profit margin of buyers is narrow. 7 Actual
competitive injury, therefore, need not be demonstrated; a reasonable
possibility of injury is sufficient.28 In Bargain Car Wash there was
commerce" have been found where the gasoline sold to a dealer was refined by the sup-
plier in a state other than the one in which the sales were made. See, e.g., Standard O11
Co. v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231, 236-38 (1951); Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.
(Indiana), 466 F.2d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1972). On the other hand, where the supplier's
refinery is within the state of resale to dealers, or where the dealer's supplier purchases
all his needs from a source within the state of resale, it has been held that the supplier's
sales to dealers were not made "in commerce" and hence no cause of action was stated
under the Robinson-Patman Act. Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 178.81 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Abramson v. Colonial Oil Co., 390 F.2d 873 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968).
Recently, however, in Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972), petition
for rehearing en banc granted, No. 71-2090, 5th Cir., Jan. 2, 1973, the Fifth Circuit held
that the "use of proceeds from interstate sales to underwrite intrastate price discrimina-
tion" stated a cause of action under the Robinson-Patman Act. See Moore v. Mead's Fine
Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). If Littlejohn is followed, jurisdictional problems under
the Robinson-Patman Act may well be simplified. See 4 ST. MARY's L.J. 204 (1972); 41
U. CIN. L. REv. 689 (1972). But see 86 HARV. L. REv. 765 (1973).
23. See F. RoWE, supra note 22, chs. 7, 8.
24. Supplier injury would occur, for example, if the price discrimination of one of
the majors drove another supplier out of business.
25. American Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
954 (1964) (price discrimination lasted only seventeen days and caused only a temporary
economic dislocation that did not constitute substantial evidence of a probable lessening
of competition); Bunty v. Shell Oil Co., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,252 (D. Nev. 1972) (discrimi-
nation for eighteen days out of three years is of transient impact, not sufficient to satisfy
the § 2 (a) standard of injury to competition).
26. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. F.T.C., 395 F.2d 517, 521 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 977 (1968).
27. See Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 466 F.2d 1163, 1174
(7th Cir. 1972); E. Edelmann & Co. v. F.T.C., 239 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. de.
nied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 962 (1959), rev'd on other grounds,
294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd on different facts, 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
28. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. F.T.C., 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945). While the "reasonable
possibility" of injury has been held to be the standard in cases of secondary-line Injury,
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ample evidence that American's sales to competing dealers at a price
eleven percent lower than to plaintiff were a substantial contributing
factor to his loss of sales.2 9
Moreover, a broader analysis of the effects of such pricing practices
demonstrates that price discrimination in the context of gasoline mar-
keting tends to lessen price competition as well as to injure competitors.
To be sure, a major supplier's price discrimination results in tempo-
rarily lower prices to consumers who patronize the supplier's favored
dealers. Such systematic selective price cutting, however, may discour-
age the dealers of major brand suppliers, independent retailers, and
independent refiner-marketers from engaging in price competition as
actively as they might otherwise.30
The beneficial effect of the efforts of independent marketers on
price competition in gasoline retailing has frequently been observed.31
Subregular gasoline sold by some majors has also sparked price compe-
tition among suppliers more accustomed to price leadership and prod-
uct differentiation. 32 If majors meet this price competition only to the
extent necessary to keep area volume steady, the impact of such price
competition is confined to narrow zones within the marketing area.
As long as favored dealers make up the gallonage lost by nonfavored
dealers, the major has succeeded in confining the area of what it terms
"the price war."33 This makes it more costly for price conscious com-
petitors to increase their share of the market and tends to discourage
both market entry and expansion.
34
It is perfectly true, of course, that a dealer is less likely to reduce his
prices if he knows that his competitor will do likewise than if he sus-
pects that he might be able to win new customers by a price reduction
that is not met. The Robinson-Patman Act does not protect competitors
primary-line cases had formerly insisted on the demonstration of actual injury before
§ 2 (a) would be violated. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. F.T.C.. 289 F.2d 835. 840
(7th Cir. 1961). But in the most recent primary-line case to reach the Supreme Court, the
possibility of a future lessening of competition was found sufficient to sustain a jury
verdict for the plaintiff. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 65, 699-
700 (1967). See generally F. ROWE, supra note 22, at 180-95.
29. 466 F.2d at 1174.
30. M. DECHAZEAU & A. KAHN, ]INTEGRATION AND CO.t'HrIrTON IN "raIE 1' TOL tM IN-
DUSrRY 476-82 (1959); Dirlam, The Petroleumn Industry, in THE SmIcTlcunE oF A.,tmcAN
INDUSTRY 301 (W. Adams ed. 1961); F. ScHERxa° supra note 5, at 261; Note. Meeting Cons.
petition and the Sun Oil Case: Repudiation of the Enterprise Doctrine, 29 U. Cit. L. REv.
355, 365 (1962). See generally ATr'Y GEN. NA'rL CoM.%.. ANTrmusr Ri,. 186 (separate
opinion of A. Kahn) (1955).
31. See N.Y. Times, May 27, 1973. § 3, at 4, cols. 1-6; F.T.C. '. Sun Oil Co.,
371 U.S. 505, 523 (1963); M. DECAZFAU & A. KANi.N supra note 20. at 383.
32. F. AL.V1NE & J. PATrERsON, supra note 7, at 141-78; Dixon, Oligopoly and Price
Wars: A Case Stud), in Gasoline, supra note 19, at 53, 68-70.
33. See p. 1709 supra.
34. See F.T.C. v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 523 (1963).
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from the possibility that a price reduction may be met in kind. If major
suppliers were not permitted to charge different prices in artificially
drawn zones, however, they would be forced to engage in city-wide
price competition. Wholesale prices would reflect the competitive con-
ditions of the entire metropolitan area. Price competitors could thus
more easily enter and grow in the market. 6
III
If proof of a § 2(a) violation is shown, a price discriminator can avoid
a cease and desist order,36 injunction3 7 or treble damages on p~oof of
injury" by demonstrating that his lower price was made in good faith
to meet an equally low price of a competitor.39 Found in violation of
§ 2(a), American argued that it price discriminated to meet the com-
petition it faced in the metropolitan area. 40 The meeting competition
defense of § 2(b), if available, is absolute, irrespective of any adverse
effect on competition caused by price discrimination.
41
Given the exclusive dealing arrangements under which gasoline is
marketed, however, it is unclear that the § 2(b) defense should be avail-
able to major oil companies like American. While the defense does not
obtain where the seller's wholesale price discrimination is in response
to price cuts generated solely at the buyer's level, 42 the following ques-
tion is still unresolved: Is the § 2(b) defense available to American if
its discriminatory price to one of its dealers is designed to meet an
equally low price of a competitor of American (e.g., Exxon) given to
a competitor of the American dealer (e.g., an Exxon dealer across the
street)? Two answers have been given.
35. See J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION 256 (1954). While competitive injury
in the form of injury to nonfavored dealers of a discriminating supplier is easier to
prove and hence is the usual competitive injury alleged in litigation such .as Bargain
Car Wash, the broader injury to price competition would be an appropriate element of
a complaint by the Federal Trade Commission. In F.T.C. v. Sun Oil Co., the Supreme Court
recognized that both forms of injury to competition may arise when a major oil com-
pany price discriminates among its dealers in a metropolitan area. 371 U.S. 505, 523
(1963).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1970).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
39. Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b)
(1970).
40. 466 F.2d at 1175.
41. Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
42. In F.T.C. v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963), the Suereme Court held that the
§ 2(b) meeting competition defense applies only to the competition of the seller (primary.
level competition), not the competition faced by a customer of the seller (secondary-level
competition). The § 2(b) defense, therefore, does not obtain when the supplier is price
discriminating among its dealers to enable them to meet competition generated solely at
the retail level, e.g., competition from a self-service station that reduces retail prices
through a decrease in overhead costs.
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In 1955, in Enterprise Industries v. Texas Co.,43 a federal district
court said no: A seller may offer a buyer a lower price only when that
particular buyer has been offered an equally low price by a competitor
of the seller. In gasoline marketing a major supplier has no competition
for customers-his dealers. Thus on this reading of § 2(b), American
may never avail itself of the meeting competition defense, there being
no competition to meet at the wholesale level. This reading shall be
referred to as the Enterprise doctrine.
Since 1967, however, the Federal Trade Commission has ignored the
Enterprise decision and has interpreted § 2(b) to mean that the defense
may be available to a major gasoline supplier if the supplier is meet-
ing the wholesale price of another major supplier or is meeting the
competition of an integrated refiner-marketer. 44 According to this
view, American can selectively reduce its wholesale price to American
dealers to meet an ostensibly legal wholesale price reduction by Exxon
to some Exxon dealers, or to meet a lower retail price posted by a re-
tail station owned by an independent refiner. This view of § 2(b) shall
be referred to as the "Commission's position."
An analysis of these two conflicting interpretations requires an
understanding of the rationale of the meeting competition defense.
The defense was written into the Robinson-Patman Act because Con-
gress realized that a seller who price discriminated in response to an
43. 136 F. Supp. 420 (D. Conn. 1955). rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
44. The Federal Trade Commission's Report on Anti.competitive Practices in the
Marketing of Gasoline, 3 TA.E REG. R'. fl 10,373, at 18,245 (1967). The Federal Trade
Commission's current reading of the § 2(b) defense has a rather tortuous history, the
Commission having reversed its position twice on the issue. Before the Enterprise deci-
sion the Commission thought the § 2(b) defense would in some cases be available to a
supplier even though there was no competition for sales to his dealers. See Hearings on
Distribution Problems Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on Small Business,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 852-53 (1955). But in Senate hearings on gasoline price wars
in 1955, the Commission declared its earlier view to be a "mistake" and embraced the
Enterprise holding. Hearings on Gasoline Price War in New Jersey Before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.. pt. 2. at 450.51 (1955).
The Senate Report following the hearings concluded that the failure of the Commission
to prevent price discrimination was a substantial cause of the chaotic marketing con-
ditions under investigation. Armed with the Enterprise decision, the Report said, the
Commission "should move promptly against any major supplier still granting discrimina-
tory price allowances." S. REP. No. 2810, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.. 28 (1951). The Commission
did just that in Sun Oil, urging the Supreme Court to adopt the Enterprise doctrine.
See note 42 supra.
After its limited victory in Sun Oil, however, an entirely new set of Commissioners de-
dared a general amnesty for oil companies then under complaint and decided to hold
still more hearings on gasoline marketing practices. S. Ot',.NmEi.t & G. Wssro%. II THE
LAWYR's RoBiso,-PAT.MAN Acr SOURCEnOOK 1182 (1971). In 1967 the Commission issued
a report on its hearings. By a 3-2 vote the Commission reversed itself again, abandoned
the Enterprise doctrine, and enunciated its more lenient current position. Neither the
hearings nor the Report focused on the Enterprise doctrine. Indeed, the Report failed
even to mention the Enterprise decision or the FTC's former support for it in Sun Oil.
See 3 TRADE REc. REP. 10,373 (1967).
1713
The Yale Law Journal
apparently lawful lower price offer of a competitor would not normally
cause any injury on the buyer level, a lower price already being avail-
able to the buyer from the competing seller.45 The supplier's price cut
can thus be viewed as nothing more than "self-defense against a price
raid by a competitor."
40
In gasoline marketing, however, the de facto exclusive dealing
arrangement between a supplier and its dealer means that the supplier
never encounters a price raid by a competitor. In Bargain Car Wash
American did not price discriminate to prevent an American dealer
from purchasing gasoline from Exxon, Texaco, Shell, or any other
competing supplier. Moreover, American's price discrimination caused
the injury at the buyer level. Had American refrained from price dis-
crimination and sold to all its dealers at the uniform price area-wide
demand dictated, the nonfavored plaintiff-dealer would not have been
injured relative to nearby competing American dealers.
Despite the compatability of the Enterprise doctrine with the ration-
ale of the § 2(b) defense, several arguments were raised against it in
litigation culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in F.T.C. v.
Sun Oil Company.47 Though the Court did not consider the Enter-
prise48 doctrine, its reasoning supports that decision.
Sun Oil argued that gasoline dealers are in reality conduits through
which retail demand is registered at the wholesale level and that a sup-
plier should therefore be allowed to reduce its wholesale prices dis-
criminatorily to a dealer being undersold by a competing dealer.40
The Court found, however, that the change from the broader "meet-
ing competition" language of the original Clayton Act50 to the nar-
rower "meet an equally low price of a competitor" language of § 2(b)
45. [W]here in fact the favored buyer has received a low nondiscriminatory offer
from a competing seller, the seller who meets that offer with a discriminatory price
cut is injuring the disfavored buyers no more than they would be injured anyway.
C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1965); F. ROWE, supra note 22, at 214.
46. Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231, 250 (1951).
47. Based on the Enterprise doctrine which it then endorsed, the FTC issued a cease
and desist order against Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955 (1959). The Fifth Circuit reversed,
rejecting the Enterprise holding, Sun Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1901). The
Supreme Court reversed, F.T.C. v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963), holding that the
§ 2(b) defense does not allow a supplier to price discriminate to enable one of its dealers
to meet competition from another retail-dealer. See note 42 supra.
48. The Court declined to express or intimate any opinion as to the content of § 2(b)
where it is shown (I) that no lower competitive offer was made to the favored dealer by
another supplier (371 U.S. at 529 n.19), or (2) where the favored dealer faces competition
from an integrated supplier dealer (371 U.S. at 512 n.7).
49. See the Fifth Circuit's decision, Sun Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 294 F.2d 465, 476-78 (1961),
citing the dissenting opinion in Standard Oil Co. of Cal. and Standard Stations v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 323 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
50. 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
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indicated that the § 2(b) defense applies to competition at the level of
the discriminator-here the supplier.51
The Court also rejected the argument that price discrimination
should be permitted to protect small gasoline retailers. Sun Oil argued
that certain of its dealers could not meet the competition they faced
without price allowances.52 It further pointed out that the Robinson-
Patman Act was passed in large part to protect small, independent re-
tailers.53 The Court read the legislative history as establishing no guar-
antee to businessmen from possible loss. The harm proscribed was
price discrimination.5 4 Major oil companies price discriminate to profit
maximize, not to keep.small retailers in business. Moreover, when one
dealer is favored with a lower price, the supplier's nonfavored dealers,
themselves small independent retailers, are injured.
Finally, Sun Oil argued that denial of the ability to price discrimi-
nate would lead to forward integration by major oil companies. They
would then operate service stations with their own employees, avoid
the jurisdiction of the Act, and be able to set whatever retail prices
they desired from station to station.55 Such a result, it was said, would
conflict with the broader purposes of a statute designed to promote
local ownership and to protect the small independent businessman. "
The Court considered the argument irrelevant because Congress
in the Robinson-Patman Act foreclosed judicial consideration of
whether price discrimination is a greater evil than forward integra-
tion. 57 The Court also considered the argument dubious because the
decision of major oil companies to lease rather than operate their sta-
tions was matde for economic reasons, uniformly compelling among
major oil companies.58
51. 371 U.S. at 524-25. See F. RowE, supra note 22, at § 9.1; Note, supra note 30, at
362.
52. 294 F.2d at 479.
53. 371 U.S. at 520.
54. Id. at 519.
55. Brief for Appellee at 29-33. Brief for Texaco, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 51-53. F.T.C.
v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
56. This was the argument of the Fifth Circuit. 294 F.2d at 478.81.
57. 371 U.S. at 528.
58. Id. at 528-29. To avoid the interference of the Robinson.Patman Act with their
pricing decisions, majors tried to set retail prices through a consignment arrangement.
This was outlawed as vertical price fixing in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13
(1964). Despite such frustrations the majors have not integrated fonard, preferring to
maintain costly zone pricing systems, to employ salesmen to survey retail prices con-
tionally and to incur the transaction costs associated with an annual dealer turnover
rate as high as thirty-five percent. See N.Y. Times, May 27, 1973, § 3, at 4, cols. 1.6;
BUsss INESWEK, May 13, 1972, at 143.
Major suppliers have several good reasons to stay out of retailing. As independent
businessmen, dealers of the same supplier cannot aggregate their bu)ing power to make
demands on the supplier without violating the Sherman AcL Not being employees of
the supplier, dealers cannot organize into unions, the collective bargaining power of
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Furthermore, the Commission's formulation of the meeting com-
petition defense is unworkable from the standpoint of public and
private detection and enforcement, and a close examination of the
"pricing system" exception to the defense suggests that the FTC posi-
tion may actually be an inarticulate proxy for the Enterprise doctrine.
The FTC position is unworkable because it depends on identifica-
tion of the original source of price competition in the area of declin-
ing retail prices. A major oil company's discriminatory pricing is jus-
tified under the FTC position if it is made in good faith 0 in response
to nondiscriminatory wholesale price reductions by other oil com-
panies. In many cases, however, it is impossible to determine the source
of price competition faced by the major. Consider, for example, the
case of an American dealer surrounded by an independent retail out-
let, a retailer owned by an independent refiner, and a major supplier
marketing a less expensive third subregular brand of gasoline. It would
be difficult to determine whose competition American is meeting when
it reduces its wholesale price to this dealer in the face of falling retail
prices. The problems of detection and proof under the FTC position
would be compounded if another supplier were to lower its wholesale
price allegedly in response to American's reduction.
Moreover, close scrutiny of the FTC position and the "pricing sys-
tem" exception which has been grafted onto it reveals that the FTC
position may, however unwittingly, not be significantly different from
the Enterprise doctrine. The courts have generally refused to allow the
§ 2(b) defense when the seller's price discrimination is the result of a
"pricing system" 60 rather than a response to individual competitive
demands. 61 Discriminatory price cuts made as part of a "pricing sys-
tem" are not closely enough related to the threatened loss of a customer
which would no doubt be considerable given the volumetric interdependence of the various
levels of the petroleum industry, the economics of refining, and the desire of majors to
avoid dual marketing whenever possible. Further, not being the dealers' employers, oil
companies avoid federal social security and minimum wage and hour legislation, as well
as state unemployment insurance and workmen's compensation laws. See S. WmIITNEY, I
ANTITRUST POLICIES 125 (1958); Brief for F.T.C. at 54, F.T.C. v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505
(1963).
59. Good faith requires the seller to demonstrate "the existence of facts which would
lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting of a lower price would
in fact meet the equally low price of a competitor." F.T.C. v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324
U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945). Good faith is lacking when the seller is meeting a price offer he
knows or should know is itself illegally discriminatory. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v.
F.T.C., 395 F.2d 517, 524 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968); Standard Oil Co. v.
Brown, 238 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1956).
60. Pricing systems became suspect under § 2(b) as an outgrowth of early cases deny.
ing the defense to companies that illegally adopted a single industry.wide pricing formula,
such as base point pricing (F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1918); F.T.C. v.
A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945)) and industry zone pricing schemes (F.T.C. v.
National Lead Co.. 352 U.S. 419 (1957)), because these pricing formulas were adopted not
to meet competition between the firms but to eliminate it.
61. See F. RowE, supra note 22, at § 9.7.
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to satisfy the conception of the meeting competition defense. Since this
defense was designed to insure a seller "the right of self-defense against
a price raid by a competitor,"0' 2 price discrimination resulting from
the marketing scheme of the seller has at times been denied the § 2(b)
defense.
63
I The unilateral pricing decisions of major gasoline suppliers may be
held to be the result of the supplier's pricing system rather than the
bilateral bargaining that the meeting competition defense contem-
plates.64 The rationale for denying a supplier the § 2(b) defense be-
cause of his use of a "pricing system" would be similar to the Enter-
prise court's rationale: There is no competitive offer to this buyer by
another supplier to meet.
Thus even if the Commission's view of § 2(b) is adopted, major oil
companies still have to clear the "pricing system" versus "individual
competitive demands" hurdle. 5 In Bargain Car Wash the court ordered
scrutiny of the construction of the metropolitan zones to determine
their legal and economic justification. This may lead to results not un-
like the Enterprise doctrine. If zones are drawn with reference to inde-
pendent retailers or to those heavily-trafficked areas where aggressive
major suppliers are likely to initiate an illegal price discrimination, it
is clear that the § 2(b) defense will not obtain, though not because of
the "pricing system" itself. In the former instance the majors would
62. Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951).
63. Standard Motor Prods. v. F.T.C., 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 361
U.S. 826 (1959). But see Calloway Mills Co. v. F.T.C.. 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966). holding
that price discrimination according to a firm's volume discount schedule does not per se
deny the availability of the § 2(b) defense. "It is only when no reasonable and prudent
person would conclude that the adopted system is a reasonable method of meeting the
lower price of a competitor that it is condemned." Id. at 442. The possibility that the
prices the seller was meeting were themselves illegally discriminator) and hence could not
be met in good faith was not raised. See Surprise Brassiere Co. v. F.T.C.. 406 F.2d 711.
715 (5th Cir. 1969). The development of the "pricing system doctrine" is criticized in
Note, Pricing Systems and the Meeting Competition Defense, 49 U. VA. L. REv. 1325
(1963).
64. In Ingram v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 259 F. Supp. 176 (D.N.M. 1966). the court
found Phillips' discrimination between jobbers to be the result of a customary industry
pricing system, i.e., not to meet any specific competition but because Humble, Texaco.
and Shell had reduced their prices to meet price cuts from independents. Id. at 184.
65. The Seventh Circuit recently indicated as much in Bargain Car lWash by stating
that while it was inclined to accept the Commission's current reading of § 2(b).
American may not sustain its burden of proving that it was merely meeting the
equally low price of a competitor simply by proving that its price cuts conformed
to its own [zone pricing] system unless the record demonstrates a valid economic
justification for that system .... In short we must know the competitive nature of
the system in its operation and its impact on individual competing American deal.
ers. Only then can the court intelligently pass upon the availability of the Section
2(b) defense in a zone operation.
466 F.2d at 1176. That it is the nature of the pricing system itself, and not the degree
of competitive injury, that could bar use of the § 2(b) defense under the court's inter-
pretation is clear when it is recalled that the meeting competition defense is absolute.
irrespective of any competitive injury that may be found. Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C.,
340 U.S. 231 (1951).
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be violating the rule of Sun Oil, and in the latter, if the initial price
discrimination is known to be illegal, there could be no good faith
meeting of competition. Thus the "pricing system" versus "individual
competitive demands" question seems to serve as but a proxy for the
underlying Enterprise doctrine.
IV
The Enterprise doctrine is a sound interpretation of § 2(b). It would
prompt a major supplier to establish one wholesale price based on area-
wide demand for its product66 rather than setting different prices
in each zone in response to the demand generated within the major's
artificially created and maintained submarkets. This would tend to
encourage majors to be more price competitive in their marketing
efforts. To the extent that marketing profits are thereby reduced, sup-
pliers would have an incentive to eliminate marginal gasoline sta-
tions.67 Given the presence of price conscious private brand marketers,
the net result may well be lower average prices than would otherwise
prevail and fewer stations with higher volume per station. 8
By contrast, the FTC's current position is unexplained and unex-
plainable.60 It is largely unworkable and uncertain in application and
serves no articulated goals. The meeting competition defense should
not be available to a gasoline supplier which discriminates among its
captive dealers.
66. This would not mean that price reductions would have to be made over an
unwarrantedly large geographic area. The Supreme Court in Sun Oil stated that the
courts and the FTC are capable of recognizing appropriate area submarkets, 371 U.S.
at 526-27 & n.17.
67. There is reason to believe majors tend to overbuild gas stations, not because con.
sumers demand so many outlets, but because the logic of the depletion allowance and
vertical integration in the oil industry encourage companies to have assured outlets for
their refinery products. See J. BAIN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PACIFIC COAST PLTROLEUM
INDUSTRY, Part III, at 95 (1947). See also Dirlam, supra note 30, at 277, 303; Rostow and
Sachs, Entry Into the Oil Refining Business: Vertical Integration Re-examined, 61 YALE
L.J. 856, 913 (1952). Indeed, major oil companies seem to concede as much when they
argue that a ban on localized price discrimination would mean that some of their dealers
would be forced out of business. See 1 Hearings of the FTC Industry Conference on
Marketing of Automotive Gasoline, supra note 7, at 559; Schwartz, Potential Impairment
of Competition, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 10, 37 (1949).
68. Such a conclusion is necessarily speculative, but the experience of one major oil
company may be suggestive. Pure Oil Co. (since merged into Union Oil Co.) changed
some "Pure" trademarked stations into independent-named stations. Upon reducing the
price by 0.50 from the price for which Pure gasoline sold, volume at the stations doubled.
When Pure did the same to other "Pure" stations and reduced price by 20 (the more
customary major-independent price differential), volume increased almost tenfold. 2
Hearings of the FTC Industry Conference on Marketing of Automotive Gasoline, supra
note 7, at 1792.
69. It is clear that the FTC did not abandon the Enterprise doctrine in the belief that
uniform area-wide pricing by suppliers would be undesirable. In January the Commission
issued a complaint against Standard Oil Co. of Ohio. Proposed relief includes a ban on
supplier sales to its dealers at other than a uniform wholesale price throughout an
appropriate competitive area. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 20,134, complaint issued Jan. 31,
1973, id. at 20,208 (1973).
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